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Field Editor: S. ParkerEntrepreneurs in emerging market economies operate in weak institutional contexts, which
can imply different types of government. In some countries (e.g., Russia), the government is
predatory, and the main risk faced by (successful) entrepreneurs relates to expropriation. In
other countries (like China) this kind of risk is lower; nevertheless the government is intrusive,
and the rules of the game remain ﬂuid. The implication of the latter for entrepreneurs is that
they are more likely to spend time and resources on inﬂuence (rent seeking) activities rather
than on productive activities.We illustrate this type of government by focusing on the distribution
of subsidies in China.We present a simple formalmodel that explores not only the direct effects of
rent seeking for a companybut also externalities under a situation of policy-generateduncertainty
in the distribution of subsidies. We explore how these effects differ for the entrepreneurial sector
(young, private and small companies) compared with other sectors. We posit that while the
performance of private companies is more affected than the performance of state ﬁrms, the
impact of government-induced uncertainty on young and small companies is actually less
pronounced. Our empirical analysis, based on a unique large dataset of 2.4 million observations
on Chinese companies, takes advantage of the regional and sectoral heterogeneity of China for
empirical tests.
© 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Keywords:
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New ﬁrms1. Executive summary
Institutions (rules and norms) shape the context in which entrepreneurs operate, and therefore affect both the opportunities and
the risks that entrepreneurs face. Entrepreneurship research initially focused on the role of formal institutions (‘rules’) (North, 1990,
2005; Baumol, 1996), with more recent studies asserting the complementary roles of informal institutions (‘norms’), in particular in
emerging economies where formal institutions are weak (e.g., Estrin et al, 2013). However, it is of substantial importance for policy
makers, practitioners and researchers to understand better the exact nature of these institutional forces, and the possible mechanism
of their impact on entrepreneurs. This is an important gap in knowledge that we aim to address.
The inadequate conceptualization of the nature and mechanism of institutional forces in the current entrepreneurship literature
is partly due to methodological limitations. Most of the existing work corresponds to the birds' eye view, where formal institutions
are modelled by measuring the broad national rules of law and regulation, and the informal norms (such as corruption and trust).
Such approaches rely on the assumption of individual ﬁrms and entrepreneurs receiving similar effects from very broad generalvan Praag for creating an excellent opportunity for us to develop theﬁrst idea of this paper at Entrepreneurship
ord. We also beneﬁted from opportunity to present this paper at a seminar at Stockholm School of Economics,
apest, and EEA conference in Toulouse. The comments and criticism of the editor, Prof. Simon Parker, and the
aining errors are our own. This is cooperative work with equal share, and the order of names of the authors is
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treatment for all economic actors, a weak one does not. Consistentwith this, in order to understand the impact of a weak institutional
environment, one needs to analyse the institutional patterns at a sub-national level.
We focus on China, one of the two largest economies in theworld, inwhich institutional heterogeneity is additionally ampliﬁed by
regional decentralisation. We propose novel measures of institutional quality, based on regional patterns in the distribution of subsi-
dies, to capture the uneven playing ﬁeld across regions and sectors of China. We demonstrate that where the playing ﬁeld is uneven,
the average performance suffers; and this effect is concentrated on large private ﬁrms, as predicted fromour conceptualmodelling. All
this is based on a unique, quality dataset of 2.4 million observations of Chinese ﬁrms, and the results are robust to alternative econo-
metric speciﬁcations.
We make a number of contributions. At our starting point, this paper advances the literature by distinguishing predatory govern-
ments from intrusive and opaque governments, and by theorising a speciﬁcmechanism ofweak institutions that is characteristic with
non-transparent government intervention.We propose a newproxy for institutional weakness related to the uneven patterns of sub-
sidies' distribution at a highly disaggregate level. We estimate the costs of weak institutions by considering the implications for per-
formance. This approach not only gives more texture to the theory on the formal institutions' inﬂuence on entrepreneurial choices of
actions, but also allows direct empirical testing of the performance consequences of these choices.
Furthermore, our empirical analysis sheds new light on one of the most fascinating cases of the emerging economies — China;
where its future economic growth hinges on balancing the state's still powerful grip, its regional decentralisation and competition.
China's development has its foundations in the ascent of “entrepreneurial capitalism” (Baumol et al., 2007) and we spell out what
are some of the key institutional difﬁculties that the development of entrepreneurship faces.
The approach we propose is applicable to many other opaque emerging market economies that, over time, evolve towards the
model of entrepreneurial capitalism. In the latter the critical role is played by new private, small, innovative ﬁrms. Motivated by
this, our contribution is to disentangle how weak institutional contexts affect young, small and private ﬁrms. We provide evidence
suggesting that, in an environment which is opaque but not predatory, young ﬁrms are not seriously affected by institutional weak-
ness because they are able to rely on their own resources, capabilities and private networks. However, big private ﬁrms' performance
is affected in those regions of China where the playing ﬁeld is uneven.
A practical implication of our research for entrepreneurs is that we offer one clear cut proxy of what to expect in given locations
when choosing to start a venture. Policymakers are in turn alerted to the costs of implementing alternative policy regimeswhichmay
not adversely affect young private businesses at their start-up, but which will affect them as soon as they grow and become larger.
2. Introduction
Under deﬁcient formal institutions, political connections are important for entrepreneurswho invest in building these connections
either to protect themselves from expropriation or to gain access to resources (Zhou, 2013; see also: Xu, 2011; Zhang, 2015). At the
same time, the relative weight of these aspects differs across emerging market economies. In particular, Puffer et al. (2010) contrast
the institutional model of Russia with that of China. In Russia, the government is predatory, and entrepreneurs are in constant risk of
expropriation. As a result, entrepreneurship remains weak, and the only businesses that thrive are those that are protected from ex-
propriation by linkages with power structures (ibid.; Aidis et al., 2008). In China, while expropriation can happen, it is an exception
rather than the norm, because the government recognises the value of entrepreneurial initiative for development (Puffer et al.,
2010). There, the critical way in which institutional weakness impacts entrepreneurs is not by the need for protection from expropri-
ation, but by the time and effort they invest in seeking access to resources via cultivating relations with the government (Zhang,
2015).
Anecdotal evidence of this phenomenon abounds. Using Baidu (the popular search engine for the Chinese World Wide Web do-
mains), we could identify a large number of commercial courses, case studies and tips for strategies and tactics offered to teach entre-
preneurs how to “deal with” the government. Equally it is remarkable to see how many online businesses advertise their products
related to government–public relations. Behind the prosperous markets for these services are the “consumers” — private entrepre-
neurs in particular; and one wonders how much effort they need to invest in their relationship with the government. Many stories
in the Chinese media give clues. In one case, a famous entrepreneur (Feng Lun) complains “how exhausting and time-consuming it
was to deal with government agents”. Mr Lun, the President of Wan Tong Group, had to take ﬂights 180 times in a year to make
sure a project application was signed off by the government.1 Similarly, one of the most successful Chinese entrepreneurs, Liu
Chuangzhi, the CEO of Lenovo, recalled that when his company was small, he had to spend more than 70% of his time and energy
in maintaining relations with the “external environment”, “governments in particular”.2 In another article about government subsi-
dies, it becomes clear from many entrepreneurs' experience, that “getting subsidies is all about having a good relationship with the
government, so you would get information in a timely manner and can access insiders to help with applications”.3
This reality makes China a fascinating example for study of how institutional framework affects entrepreneurship. Learning from
the failures of the state-centred development model, China started to drift away from it in the late 1970s (Huang, 2008; Lu and Tao,
2010; Zhang, 2015). China's drift was followed – about ten years later – by India and many other emerging market economies. Over
the last three decades, China experienced unprecedented economic growth, and became the second largest economy in theworld. The1 Source: Phoenix Media TV interview; http://ﬁnance.ifeng.com/business/renwu/20130128/7610444.shtml, as accessed on the 16th of February, 2015.
2 Source: http://management.yidaba.com/zhengfu/, as accessed on the 16th of February, 2015.
3 Source: New Beijing News at http://epaper.bjnews.com.cn/html/2013-01/24/content_405802.htm?div=-1), access on the 16th of February 2015.
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China to foreign investment (Coase and Wang, 2012; Huang, 2008; Lu and Tao, 2010; Nee and Opper, 2012). Correspondingly, in
mainland China, economic dynamism originated from the emerging private sector companies and, to a great extent, this model of de-
velopment drew upon the earlier experiences of various successful small economies dominated by ethnic Chinese businesses
(Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong), as other neighbouring economies (like South Korea) were also directionally moving towards
what Baumol et al. (2007) label as “entrepreneurial capitalism”.
Nevertheless, Chinese entrepreneurs were often in a disadvantageous position compared with the state sector, even if for much of
the time since the reforms started, government policies were ‘directionally liberal’; that is they enhanced opportunities for entrepre-
neurship (Huang, 2008; see also: Tsang, 1994; Zhao and Aram, 1995; Lu and Tao, 2010; Coase andWang, 2012). Success was possible
because the gains from entrepreneurship were strong enough to counterbalance various privileges in the access to ﬁnance and other
resources that the state sector companies continued to enjoy (Lu and Tao, 2010; Zhang, 2015).
Although this process of liberalisation has not been uninterrupted (Huang, 2008) it does still continue; China has not yet
achieved a stable institutional equilibrium. For development in China to be sustainable in the future, it is necessary to maintain
the momentum of institutional reforms in building an inclusive market environment (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Such re-
forms would see a pronounced shift from the uncertainty induced by the lack of transparent rules towards a strong rule-based
system.While the government is no longer hostile to private enterprise, many instruments of state capitalism in China continue
to interfere with business, including through the subsidising of ﬁrms in a non-transparent way (Haley and Haley, 2013). This is
the focus of our paper.
Using subsidy is by nomeans exclusive to China. In fact, subsidies are common both in the developingworld and in the developed
economies.What is uncommon in the case of China, and hence attractingmuch interest, is that subsidies are spread over a large spec-
trumofﬁrms and a broad range of sectors, and frequent changes in policies are observed (Haley andHaley, 2013). It is difﬁcult tomake
sense of the patterns of Chinese subsidies, as there is no ofﬁcial document explaining the subsidising rules (Girma et al., 2009). While
the government produces strategy documents that set up broad priorities for subsidisation, the actual nitty-gritty of these ﬁnancial
ﬂows gives the external appearance of ad hoc interventions (Haley and Haley, 2013). As a result, government remains “the strongest
stakeholder” (Tang and Tang, 2012), and for entrepreneurs, being able to access and inﬂuence those who distribute resources in the
administrative and political hierarchy is an important resource (Zhang, 2015). Building these political connections requires allocating
effort to unproductive activities. They are unproductive in the sense thatwhile they generate gains for individual entrepreneurs, these
gains result from resource redistribution, not from creating additional value. At the same time, the gains comewith a deadweight cost
(Baumol, 1996; Mueller, 2003; Zhang, 2015).
The institutional weaknesswe focus on does not result from the presence of the subsidies per se. Instead, it results from the lack of
clarity in their distribution, which in turn creates scope for unproductive rent seeking activities by entrepreneurs. We posit that this
lack of clarity is manifested by uneven distribution of subsidies among companies that are not dissimilar.
As we will argue below, while a direct individual effect of receiving a subsidy is positive, both the individual cost of rent seeking
and the externality effects of others also receiving subsidies affect the average performance negatively, to the degree that in some
cases these negative inﬂuences may well counterbalance the gains.
As the Chinese state sector continues to shrink, the unevenness in distribution does not only apply to the state–private axis. Some
big and old private companies also enjoy political rents. Moreover, when government subsidies are unevenly distributed within the
local business environment, the entrepreneurial sector (young, private and small companies) is affected in a different way to the old,
state-owned and large ﬁrms.Wewill argue that although performance of private companies is disproportionallymore affected by this
than is the performance of state ﬁrms, the impact of government-induced uncertainty on young and small companies is actually less
pronounced. This is because, compared to their old and big counterparts, the young and small companies face relatively high set-up
costs of building government connections and of lobbying for government supports, which make themmore reliant on a strictly pri-
vate set of resources and networks at the initial stage.
Investigating these questions is not easy from the empirical point of view, as the lack of transparency leads to difﬁculty in ﬁnding
detailed or complete statistics that provide a reasonably good overview of the phenomenon (Haley andHaley, 2013), and accordingly
there is very limited research conducted on the topic. We are able to overcome this difﬁculty by testing our hypotheses based on a
large ﬁrm level dataset of 2.4 million observations over 1998–2008 that contains information on subsidy ﬂows.
To summarize we see the key elements of our contribution in the following way:
First, as observed by Bruton et al. (2008, p. 10), “the exact nature of institutional forces is not yetwell conceptualized”, in particular
for emerging market economies. Addressing this, we focus on a speciﬁc mechanism of weak institutions— non-transparent govern-
ment intervention through uneven distribution of subsidies. This stands in sharp contrast to most of the existing work that considers
the aggregate level whenmodelling formal institutions, for example bymeasuring the broad characteristics of lawand regulation, and
informal institutions such as corruption or trust in a society. Such measures rarely go down to micro level and, when combined with
ﬁrm- or entrepreneur-level analyses, the underlying assumption is that individuals receive homogenous effects from very broad and
general institutional conﬁgurations. In our work, we challenge this perspective. We proxy institutional weakness via focusing on the
patterns of subsidies' distribution on a highly disaggregate level. This gives texture to the theory on formal institutions' inﬂuence on
entrepreneurs.
Second, the institutional economics and entrepreneurship literature seem to conclude that in transitional economies with under-
developed institutions, the formal institutional voids are substituted with informal institutions, and some functional balance emerges
between formal and informal institutions. Hence the focus of the debate is on the beneﬁts of such institutional conﬁgurations, and not
on the cost of it (e.g., Puffer et al., 2010). In contrast, we highlight the latter.
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undertake unproductive versus productive activities, andwe explore the ﬁrms' performance consequent to the corresponding behav-
iour. The direct focus on performance addresses a gap in the entrepreneurship literature identiﬁed by Chen et al. (2011).3. Theoretical framework
3.1. Level playing ﬁeld, decentralisation and institutional quality
Following Estrin et al. (2013) we deﬁne the quality of economic institutions by the extent to which the rule of law prevails in the
economy. Institutions based on the rule of law are those that support level playing ﬁeld for all economic actors, and for newcomers
and entrepreneurs in particular, enabling them to both cooperate and compete on the market. However, extending this perspective,
we argue that weak rule of lawmay be associatedwith at least two very different institutional contexts. The ﬁrst of these is the case of
predatory government. Aidis et al. (2008) andPuffer et al. (2010) discuss its implications for entrepreneurship. A formalmodel of such
an environment has been presented by Parker (2009) extending and clarifying earlier work by Murphy et al. (1993).
In this paper however, we focus on a different case: that of a governmentwhich does not behave in a predatorymanner but its role
in resource reallocation does not follow a clear set of rules and procedures. Universal rules do not apply. They are replaced by selective
and arbitrary distribution of resources. This creates uncertainty for entrepreneurs. As the rewards are deﬁned by the government, the
incentive structure leads entrepreneurs to invest effort into unproductive inﬂuence and rent-seeking activities.
Below,we offer a simple formalisation of such a context and, in the empirical section, apply this perspective to China, to investigate
the microeconomic performance implications of these phenomena. What makes China an interesting case study is the degree of re-
gional heterogeneity in its institutional environment (e.g., Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003; Tsang, 1994; Xu, 2011). Unlike the former So-
viet Block, which drew on the same set of ideological beliefs, China was always decentralised across its territory (Xu, 2011), and this
became a key characteristic that from the late 1970s facilitated a gradual shift towards a more functional institutional model, relying
upon local institutional entrepreneurship and institutional diffusion over space (Coase and Wang, 2012; Weingast, 1995; Zhang,
2015).
Decentralisation implies that institutional quality differs across Chinese regions. In some areas, similar companies face similar
treatment by the government, while in some others they do not. Building on this observation, we argue the following: First, where
the subsidies are distributed in a more uneven way, the average company's ﬁnancial performance will be lower, due to additional
(rent seeking) inﬂuence costs. Second, we expect some categories of companies to bemore negatively affected than others. In partic-
ular, the implications for the entrepreneurial sector may differ: we contrast private companies with state owned companies, large
companies with small companies, and old companies with young companies. Wewill discuss all these points in turn and summarize
our arguments with a simple formal model.3.2. Weak institutions and ﬁrms' proﬁtability
Fig. 1 below presents the basic framework we apply. We provide the main intuitions ﬁrst; then in the remaining part of Section 2
we elaborate on details. In Section 3, we present the algebra that generates Fig. 1, and ﬁnally we summarize the discussion with
hypotheses.
We ﬁrst notice that if government policy is effective, mean proﬁtability in a given group of companies should increase with the
number of ﬁrms receiving subsidies: ﬁnancial support for a particular sectoral-regional activity implies additional proﬁt for compa-
nies. Mean proﬁtability should increase, even if some of the additional cash is shared with owners of local resources that the compa-
nies are bidding for against each other. We label this case “Effective Intervention” (Scenario A). In a Pigouvian world of efﬁcient and
benevolent government, this is the only case that is possible (Pigou, 2001 [1924]).Fig. 1. Subsidies and ﬁnancial performance: a conceptual framework.
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chanically manipulated by government administrators endowed with perfect foresight. Moreover, there may be information asym-
metry, with administrators knowing less about companies than their owners or managers. Even if the information were available,
the administrators are characterized by bounded rationality. And their objectives may be difﬁcult to translate into a clear blueprint
for intervention. Finally, their motivation may be problematic, as their private interests may interfere with those public interests
they are expected to represent. It is sufﬁcient that only some of these phenomena are present to create space for inﬂuence activities
(rent seeking) by ﬁrms' managers. In which case, the effects of intervention become very different.
In particular, we distinguish between the following two outcomes: “Counterproductive Intervention” (Scenario B) and “Non-
transparent Government” (Scenario C). Under Scenario B, the positive impact of subsidies is always offset by rent seeking cost, com-
petition for rents results in proﬁts from rents being driven down to zero, and subsidies have no (mean) impact. This scenario is well
known from the literature (Posner, 1975), therefore we do not elaborate upon it.
In contrast, under Scenario C, it is the lack of transparency in subsidies' delivery that matters. As most of the political economy /
public choice theory relates to developedmarket economies (e.g., Mueller, 2003), it comes as no surprise that we found no references
in the literature to such a model. We argue below that Scenario C is more likely in the case of China.
Under Scenario C, there are two polar cases depicted in Fig. 1 below. On the far left, no ﬁrm in a given category receives subsidies.
On the far right, subsidies are distributed according to transparent rules and therefore all similar ﬁrms are equally subsidised. What
these two situations have in common is that similar ﬁrms are treated in a similar way. As a result, applying Kornai's (1986) terminol-
ogy, the effort ofmanagers, responding to any changes inmarket conditions, is focused on the “productive sphere” not on the “control
sphere”, as there are no gains to be made from the latter. In contrast, where the rules are not clear and a company may or may not
receive support, the “control sphere” becomes critical:“In the ﬁrst case the ﬁrm reacts in the real sphere and in the second case in the control sphere. In the ﬁrst case it acts in the
factory and in the second case in the ofﬁces of the ministry, tax authority or bank. In the ﬁrst case themain element of reaction
is production— the adjustment of the input and output combination to the new situation. In the second the main elements are
requests, complaints and bargaining— in other words, attempts tomanipulate those on whom tax remissions, subsidies, soft
credit, and so on depend.”
[(Kornai, 1986: 43; italics as in the original text).]Consequently, time and energy, which are managerial resources, are spent on establishing and maintaining a relationship with
local governments, regulators or bankers, which is what Baumol (1996) labels as unproductive activity. Where the system of govern-
ment subsidies' distribution is the least transparent, these rent seeking activities will also be the highest. It is there that the positive
(mean) effects of subsidies will be counterbalanced by costs of rent seeking via ‘control sphere’ activities.
Taken together, this leads to the U-shaped curve as illustrated by Case C in Fig. 1 below, but we postpone the formalisation of this
idea to Section 3. Before that, we intend to introduce an additional angle, and posit that the effects we just discussed will affect differ-
ent types of companies in a different way, making it a useful framework for entrepreneurship theory, as we focus on the companies'
attributes used to operationalize entrepreneurship (Parker, 2009).
3.3. Uneven playing ﬁeld: private versus state companies
Hellman et al. (2003) and Drifﬁeld et al. (2013) argue that – contrasted with private ﬁrms – state ﬁrms ﬁnd inﬂuencing the gov-
ernmentmore easy, particularly in weak institutional environments. State ﬁrms can rely on direct links with the state administration,
hence they do not need to invest heavily in rent seeking. As argued by Zhang (2015), they are “full-membership rent-seekers” (ibid., p.
133). In contrast, private entrepreneurs need to create relational capital with administrators and politicians in order to gain access to
resources. This pattern is characteristic of all partly privatised, partly reformed economies, where entrepreneurs need to engage in
rent seeking to match the state sector advantages (Mickiewicz, 2009). The less transparent the government is, the more likely it is
that the inﬂuence costs of the private companies will be higher compared with those incurred by state companies.
In the Chinese context, this is further facilitated in the case of state companies by a larger overlapbetween themanagerial positions
and political afﬁliation (Lu and Tao, 2010). Moreover, for many state ﬁrms' managers, their enterprise is “a springboard for becoming
bureaucrats” (Zhang, 2015, p. 220), again indicating a close relation between the spheres of state sectorﬁrms and state administration.
With regard to China, Nee and Opper (2012) notice two features of state ﬁrms that contrast with private companies: egalitarian
wage structures and guarantees of lifelong employment (see also: Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Frydman et al., 1999; La Porta and
Lópes-de-Silanes, 1999). In addition, there is extensive proﬁt diversion by managers for private gain (Zhang, 2015). This implies
thatwhile stateﬁrms aremore likely to become addressees of state support, the proﬁtability of stateﬁrmswill not varywith subsidies,
as the support is likely to be matched by the diversion of resources away from proﬁt maximisation and towards both employees and
managers.
More generally, due to the lack of property rights, those who control the state ﬁrms cannot separate distributional decisions from
optimisation decisions; and that affects performance. Additional resources provided by the government are shared as rents by the
managers and theworkers. Again, this argument suggests that the proﬁtability of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) will be less impact-
ed by the extent of subsidies.
In contrast, private enterprises are often found to be unable to operate under the same business conditions and with the same
policy treatments as the state-owned ﬁrms and foreign-invested ﬁrms (Huang, 2003). They are less able to access key factors of
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tax rates (Chen et al., 2011; Du et al., 2014), in particular when there are ﬁscal deﬁcits (Chen et al., 2011). In response to these
constraints, private enterprises can be seen developing and exploiting their relational social capital with government ofﬁcials, bank
ofﬁcials, and executives at other ﬁrms (Cai et al., 2011; Du and Girma, 2010; Du et al., 2013; Tsang, 1994; Zhao and Aram, 1995),
with the aim of circumventing their unfavorable status. Yet, aswe argued above, the importance of these activities distortsmanagerial
time allocation, driving it away from the focus on value creation towards control sphere (Zhang, 2015).
Moreover, owners and managers of ﬁrms (particularly private ﬁrms) operating in a weak institutional environment are cautious
about reinvesting their proﬁts and instead channelmore resources towards consumption (Tsang, 1994). This is because the policy un-
certainty they face erodes the value of the expected return on investment. At the same time, ﬁrms' growth and sustained proﬁtability
crucially depends on proﬁt being ploughed back into the business; hence it is reasonable to assume that the resulting overly cautious
investment behaviour may also have a negative impact on proﬁtability.
3.4. Large versus small; old versus young
While the Chinese state sector is still large, the private sector is growing faster. The number of individually owned businesses has
increased from 98,000 in 1978 to 10.9million in 2010, just about 110-fold. The last decade has seen high growth in the private sector's
turnover by more than 30% and the contribution of one-third of GDP and four-ﬁfths of all the new jobs (Du et al., 2014). Much of the
empirical literature on China, as already cited, interprets private ownership as the characteristic that deﬁnes the extent of the entre-
preneurial sector. Without denying it, we postulate that a ﬁnely-graded distinction between the small versus the large, and (even
more so) between the young versus the old is important. As we will argue below, the implications of the institutional weakness for
young and small companies may differ from the general implications for the private sector.
Nee and Opper (2012) provide evidence showing that small companies are under the radar screen of local politicians. In contrast,
politicians and administrators actively seek contact with large companies, and are more responsive to requests coming from large
companies' managers. As a result, while it is relatively easy for the managers of large companies to establish cosy relationships
with local politicians; themanagers of small companies are unlikely to bewelcomed in the inner circles of the local political capitalism
networks. A pattern like this would suggest that entrepreneurs running small companies invest less time and effort in building rela-
tional capital with the government than their larger company counterparts.
In addition, theremay beﬁxed costs of lobbying for government support. Lobbying implies establishing social contacts andoffering
gifts to politicians and public administrators. These gifts can come in the formof socially acceptable private transfers (e.g., hospitality),
illegal transfers (bribes), or as support for public causes prioritised by the administrators (charity) (Du et al., 2013; Huang, 2008;
Tsang, 1994; Xin and Pearce, 1996). At the same time, politicians face time and attention constraints, hence larger transactions are
likely to be prioritised. That again makes the phenomenon of rent-seeking more characteristic in resource-abundant ﬁrms, which
tend to be larger in size.
Some of the arguments related to the size of ﬁrms are easily extended to the age of ﬁrms. Just as with small ﬁrms, young ﬁrms are
likely to operate under the radar screen of local politicians;moreover, these two aspects – size and age – are related in an obviousway.
Thus, returns for rent seeking efforts by young ﬁrms should also be lower than those of old ﬁrms.
However, while ﬁrms are typically born small, the impact of size and age on the intensity of rent-seeking may also differ. As
highlighted by Olson (1982), for any organisation, rent seeking effects are ampliﬁed only over a longer period of time, and this argu-
ment can easily be applied at the micro level of an entrepreneur dealing with local administrators. In particular, new ﬁrms are in the
process of building their resources and capabilities base, and in the initial phase they may rely more on their private networks (Nee
and Opper, 2012) than on networkingwith the formal institutions as represented by the government. This makes them less sensitive
to the formal environment.
4. Simple formalisation and hypotheses
We nowmove on to summarize some of the intuitions discussed above in a simple formal model. Inevitably, some aspects of the
discussion above will be left aside, and our focus will only be on a few core elements.
We envisage a sector that consists of a number of companies that may sell a similar product on a global market but are competing
against each other in local markets for inputs. Some companies receive subsidies, while others do not. We assume that for each com-
pany that receives a subsidy, the value of the subsidy is identical. The probability of receiving a subsidy varieswith the company's rent
seeking effort. The percentage of companies that are awarded subsidies is exogenously given (decided by the public budget's holder),
and is deﬁned by n.
Let's us next deﬁne Ri as the expected value of the subsidy (rent) that a company i gains; and Ii as the inﬂuence cost incurred by the
company in order to gain that subsidy. Then supposing the representative company is risk-neutral, we summarize our assumptions
about the way the expected income (Yi) of the company from rent seeking is determined, in the following way:E Yið Þ ¼ Ri−Ii−αnRi ð1ÞE Rið Þ ¼ βn ln Iið Þ ð2Þ
28 J. Du, T. Mickiewicz / Journal of Business Venturing 31 (2016) 22–38where α and β are parameters andRi≥0; Ii ≥0;0≤n≤1; 0≤α≤1; βN0:Parameter α corresponds to the magnitude of the negative externalities resulting from the fact that when a larger share of com-
panies in a given local market receive subsidies, they will compete more for local inputs, driving up some costs. Parameter β relates
to the ‘rent production function’ and captures the expected rate according to which the expenditure on the inﬂuence is transformed
into rents from the subsidies. For rent seeking to be present, it needs to exceed zero. The use of the natural logarithm in this function
corresponds to the idea that there are diminishing returns from rent seeking (inﬂuence) activities. In turn, n appears in Eq. (2), be-
cause with the larger (exogenously given) share of companies that are awarded subsidies in the local market, the pool of awards
increases.
The critical assumption behindEqs. (1) and (2) is that the overallmagnitude of subsidies is not so large that the (local) government
hits its budget constraint. If the latter were the case we would have to consider a model where the average size of an individual
subsidy varied inversely with the share of companies receiving subsidies. In the empirical section below we will provide evidence
that this scenario does not seem likely.
Substituting from Eq. (2) back into Eq. (1), taking the ﬁrst derivative, and dropping the expectation operator for convenience,
we obtain:∂Y
∂I
¼
n−αn2
 
β
I
−1 ¼ 0: ð3ÞAnd therefore the optimum amount of investment into inﬂuence (rent seeking) becomes:I ¼ β n−αn2
 
: ð4ÞThat implies that the optimum amount of investment in rent seeking is likely to vary with the share of ﬁrms receiving subsidies in
the local market in a non-monotonic way.
Substituting Eq. (4) back into the income function Eq. (1), we obtain:Yi ¼ β n−αn2
 
ln β n−αn2
 h i
−1
n o
: ð5ÞThis is non-monotonic in n, the share ofﬁrms in the localmarket receiving subsidies. For the combination of parameterswhereα is
not high relative to β, it results in a U-shaped function parallel to the scenario C (of arbitrary government) in Fig. 1 above. The
restriction on parameters is intuitive, because β represents the individual-level productivity of rent seeking effort, and α corresponds
to negative externalities of rent seeking experienced at the individual level. Clearly, high αwith respect to β could imply that negative
externalities from rent seeking exceed the expected gain, causing the logic of the model to collapse.
Consistent with this, we posit:
H1. Theproportion ofﬁrms receiving the subsidies in a given localmarketwill affectmeanproﬁtability in a non-monotonic, U-shaped
manner.
Now, as discussed in the previous section, we expect the returns to rent-seeking investments to be higher for managers of both
older and larger companies compared to entrepreneurs. We may introduce it back into our model by assuming that we now have
two types of companies. For Type 1 companies, we have β1 N 0. For Type 2 companies we have β2 = 0 and they neither invest in
rent seeking nor do they receive any subsidies. Since Type 1 companies invest in rent seeking, optimization for them follows the
similar logic as before, except that now the expectation has to account both for the proportion of ﬁrms that will actually receive
subsidies (n, as before) and the proportion of ﬁrms that are of Type 1 (i.e., they can receive subsidies; denoted by m). Accordingly,
instead of Eq. (1) we now have:E Yið Þ ¼ Ri−Ii−α
n
m
Ri: ð6ÞFollowing the same logic as before, we obtain the expected income for Type 1 companies:Yi ¼ β
n
m
1−αnð Þ ln β n
m
1−αnð Þ
h i
−1
n o
: ð7ÞAll this holds, as long as n, the share of companies receiving subsidies (decided exogenously) is lower than the share of the
companies that can receive subsidies (Type 1),m.
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becomes a negative linear function of revenue of rent seeking that the Type 1 companies obtain. Accordingly, for them, Eq. (1) now
reduces to:E Y j
 
¼−αnRi: ð8ÞIt follows that we have the non-monotonicity in n for Type 1 companies, which are the only ones that invest in rent seeking.
In contrast, for Type 2 companies present in the sector, proﬁtability will decease monotonically with n due to negative externalities
produced on the local input markets: income of Type 2 companies will still be affected by αnRi. Therefore:
H2. The non-monotonic (U-shaped) effects of the proportion of ﬁrms receiving the subsidies in a given local market are stronger on
large companies compared with small.
H3. The non-monotonic (U-shaped) effects of the proportion of ﬁrms receiving the subsidies in a given local market are stronger on
older companies compared with younger.
Finally, in order to explain the difference between state-owned and private companies, we need to introduce ownership-speciﬁc
effects. As argued above, state companies have close ties with the government and receive subsidies with little effort. Simplifying it for
the sake ofmodelling, wemay say that investment in inﬂuence becomes spurious for state companies. They do not invest in rent seek-
ing, but for a very different reason to small and young companies, as discussed above.We capture this by introducing a newparameter
γ into the rent production function, and by making both γ and β vary with ownership characteristics O: S corresponding to the state
sector, and P corresponding to the private sector, so that:γON0 if O ¼ S;γO ¼ 0 if O ¼ Pβ0 ¼ 0 if O ¼ S;β0N0 if O ¼ P:Eq. (2) becomes:Ri ¼ β0n ln Iið Þ þ γ0: ð9ÞIt is easy to verify that solving this newmodel results again in Eq. (5) for private companies, as γ plays no role in the optimization.
However, with β=0, state companies make no investment in rent seeking. On the other hand, their income from subsidies is always
positive and simply given as Y* = γ . There is no longer any non-monotonicity associated with n.
In contrast, for private ﬁrms, the optimization corresponds to the Eq. (5) as before. Again, we obtain non-monotonicity in n, due to
the interaction of β with n. Therefore, we receive:
H4. The non-monotonic (U-shaped) effects of the proportion of ﬁrms receiving the subsidies in a given local market are stronger for
private companies than for state companies.
5. Data, summary statistics and deﬁnitions of variables
5.1. Data
We conduct the empirical analysis based on the Annual Reports of Industrial Enterprise Statistics, compiled by the National Statis-
tical Bureau of China (NSB) over the period of 1998–2008. The NSB strives to ensure consistency in data collection across geographical
regions and industries, and audits a selection of ﬁrms to ensure accuracy of the ﬁnancial data (Tan and Peng, 2003). The data covers
the population of SOEs and non-state owned ﬁrms with annual sales above 5 million RMB, which makes it the most comprehensive
ﬁrm level dataset available for China; it has been recently adopted in the research on Chinese ﬁrms (for example Brandt et al., 2013;
Du andGirma, 2007). These ﬁrms operate in themanufacturing andmining sectors and come from all 31 provinces ormunicipal cities
across China.
Several advantages of this dataset over others are crucial for the purpose of this study. First of all, the population of the SOEs and
the complementary data of non-state owned enterprises account for 85–90% of total output inmost industrial sectors,whichpermits a
highly representative description of the industrial dynamics. The rare comprehensive data coverage, across ﬁrms and over time,
allows us to build a proﬁle of ﬁrms of different ages and to observe their performances over the decade. Second, the close-to-
population ﬁrms' coverage makes it possible to study the external effects of government subsidies.
The ﬁnal datamatrixwas subject to careful cross checking and cleaning, andwe paid particular attention to ensure the consistency
of ﬁrm identiﬁcation, industrial concordances and ownership classiﬁcation (for more details see also: Du et al., 2014). The observa-
tions with negative or zero employment records were dropped, as were those with negative assets and intermediate inputs. The
variables of interest have been trimmed by 1% on each side of the distribution. After cleaning out the observationswithmissing values
Table 1
Summary statistics.
Description Mean S.D. Min Max
Variables
Proﬁtability Total proﬁt over total assets 0.087 0.193 −0.233 1.096
Age Number of years since the establishment of the ﬁrm 11 11 1 97
Size Log (total revenue +1) 4.699 1.131 0.000 7.810
HHI Herﬁndahl–Hirschman index 0.060 0.105 0.000 1.000
Dispersion indicators of subsidy
Subsidy coverage (Coverage) Coverage ratio of subsidy in terms of ﬁrm assets, by county/sic2/year 0.222 0.282 0.000 1.000
Median deviation of subsidy (mdev) Median absolute deviation of subsidy, scaled down by 100. 1.233 2.234 0.000 16.162
Firm ownership by ofﬁcial registration
State-owned ﬁrm 0.096 0.294 0.000 1.000
Collectively owned ﬁrm 0.147 0.355 0.000 1.000
Share-holding ﬁrm 0.152 0.359 0.000 1.000
Private ﬁrm 0.399 0.490 0.000 1.000
Foreign-invested ﬁrm 0.206 0.404 0.000 1.000
Observations 2,399,047
30 J. Du, T. Mickiewicz / Journal of Business Venturing 31 (2016) 22–38in the variables of interest, we identiﬁed 662,805 ﬁrms corresponding to 2,399,047 ﬁrm-year observations over the period 1998 and
2008, for which we have the necessary information for the econometric estimation.
5.2. Variables
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables of interest. The dependent variable, proﬁtability, is the commonly used
indicator of Return on Assets (ROA), calculated by dividing total proﬁt over total assets.
In order to test our hypotheses, we need a measure of distribution of subsidies over a given cluster of ﬁrms. We capture the dis-
persion in ﬁrm subsidies in two slightly different ways to describe how stretched or squeezed the distribution of subsides is. We
ﬁrst construct a simple measure of subsidies' coverage ratio (Cov) deﬁned as a share of subsidised ﬁrms' (i) assets in overall assets,
where the latter are aggregated over each cell deﬁned by: six-digit geographic region equal to county level (k), two-digit industrial
sector (j), and year (t):coveragejkt ¼
X
i
Total assetsijkt jsubsidyiN0
 
X
i
Total assetsijkt
:This measure describes the weighted share of subsidised ﬁrms in the local population of ﬁrms, where the latter is deﬁned by
regional-sectoral-annual cells. According to our calculation, on average, 22% of ﬁrms (weighted by assets) across all cells (of county,
industry and year) received government subsidy. In addition, the standard deviation of 28% and the full range of coverage ratio value
(0–1) show that the cell heterogeneity is also large. Some industries in some locations and in some years receivedmanymore subsi-
dies than others.
The second measure of subsidy distribution is a commonly used measure of statistical dispersion, the median absolute deviation
(mdev), which is a strongly robust measure of the variability of a univariate sample of quantitative data (Rousseeuw and Croux,
1993):mdevjkt ¼ median subsidyi−medianjkt subsidy jkt
 

 
:Again,we calculate thismeasure for each cell of a region, an industry and a year, and then scale down the value ofmdevby 100. The
variable shows as high standard deviation as the ﬁrst measure.
Bothmeasures are informative on the subsidy distribution amongﬁrms in thedeﬁned cells, but they have slightly different foci and
hence may be seen as complementary. We build our analysis on both measures as each of these have potential limitations. The cov-
erage ratio captures the percentage of activity being subsidised as proxied by total assets, but here the larger number of super-sized
ﬁrms in a cellmay increase the coverage ratio. In the latter case, the higher coverage does not necessarilymeanwider coverage of sub-
sidies in the local population of ﬁrms. In turn, themdevmeasure describes the dispersion in the amount of subsidies among ﬁrms. But
since it does not take into consideration the number of the subsidy recipients, a high mdev dispersion does not always imply more
uneven distribution, as it may be affected by uneven ﬁrm size distribution within the cell. Nevertheless, a simple partial correlation
test shows high correlation of 60% between these two measures, as reported in Table 2.
Table 2
Correlation matrix.
Proﬁtability Subsidy coverage Median deviation Age Size
Subsidy coverage −0.049⁎
Median deviation −0.059⁎ 0.598⁎
Age −0.134⁎ −0.005⁎ 0.032⁎
Size −0.078⁎ −0.007⁎ 0.045⁎ 0.213⁎
HHI −0.081⁎ −0.058⁎ −0.002⁎ 0.142⁎ 0.017⁎
Note: Partial correlations. See Table 1 for deﬁnitions of variables.
⁎ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
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cell, but do vary across 6-digit region (county level), 2-digit industrial sector and year. It is not surprising that the total variance of
coverage variables is dominated by industrial variation more than regional differences, and the patterns are stable over time.4
Our H2 and H3 relate to corresponding interactive effects of age and size with distribution of subsidies. We also include the
individual effects of these components directly in our models, in addition to their interactions. Over 1998–2008, the average age of
ﬁrms is 11 years. The average ﬁrm size is 108 employees, yet ﬁrm size displays large heterogeneity.
In order to test H4, in this paper we classify ﬁrm's ownership by its ofﬁcial registration records. The ﬁnal dataset is comprised of
nearly 10% of state-owned ﬁrms, 15% of collectively owned ﬁrms, 15% share-holding ﬁrms, 40% private ﬁrms and 21% foreign-
invested ﬁrms.
It is interesting to explore how our dependent variable is partitioned by the ownership cross section. State companies tend to be
lossmaking,with themeanROAat−1%. In contrast, for the collective enterprisesmean ROA is 9%, for shareholding companies it is 7%,
for foreign companies 6% and ﬁnally it is an impressive 13% for private ﬁrms. All these differences are highly signiﬁcant when the
means are tested against each other using t test.
Finally, we control for market concentration ratio applying Herﬁndahl–Hirschman index (HHI). It is calculated as HHI=∑i = 1N si2,
where si is the market share of ﬁrm i and N is the total number of ﬁrms in industry j. Thus max(HHI) = 1, when there is a single
monopoly producer,whilemin(HHI)=1/Nwhen the industry consists of N equal-sizedﬁrms. HHI depicts themarket structure better
than the concentration ratio (Stigler, 1964).
5.3. Empirical speciﬁcation and estimation methodology
For the sake of transparency,we startwith amodelwhere proﬁtability of a ﬁrm is regressed on the subsidies' coverage (linear term
only) and controls as discussed in the previous section. Thus, we specify a proﬁtability function in the following form:4 We
one-thir
are avaiπ
it
¼ α þ β0Covit þ χ0Xit þ νt þ νi þ εit ; ð1Þwhere i indexes ﬁrms, t denotes year and π denotes ﬁrm proﬁtability that is the dependent variable (ROA). The function includes a
time-speciﬁc component (vt), an individual ﬁrm ﬁxed-effect term (vi), and an idiosyncratic error term (εit). The vt element of the
error term takes into account the macroeconomic environment factors. The vi element captures all time-invariant ﬁrm level ﬁxed
effects thatmay determineﬁrmproﬁtability. It is worth noting that the industrial sector and regional characteristics that stay constant
over time are already included in the ﬁrm level ﬁxed effects.
As mentioned above, in addition to the core independent variables, three variables that appear in the previous literature and are
commonly employed in explaining ﬁrm proﬁtability are also included in our model as control variables (in vector X above). The
natural logarithm of total employees is used to measure ﬁrm size, and is expected to be positively related to proﬁtability. Firm age
is measured as the number of years since the ﬁrm was initially established, and is expected to be positively related to proﬁtability.
Our main interest is to investigate how uneven distribution of subsidies affects ﬁrm's proﬁtability and, based on the theoretical
discussion, we expect that Model (1) above is misspeciﬁed in that the square term is missing. In particular, a more even distribution
of subsidies takes place either where the number of ﬁrms receiving subsidies is large, or where the coverage is very high. It is in the
middle of a given region-sector cell where we face a polarisation: numerous companies receive support while many others are left
out; this deﬁnes the most uneven playing ﬁeld. Accordingly, we expect the sign of the linear term in coverage to be negative and
the sign of quadratic term to be positive, consistent with H1. This corresponds to our Model (2):πit ¼ α þ β0Covit þ γ0Cov2 it þ χ0Xit þ νt þ νi þ εit : ð2Þinvestigated the distribution of coverage across sectors and regions using the basic variance decomposition technique, and ﬁnd that at the cell level, less than
d of total variance is due to the regional differences, while about two-third comes from industrial differences. The ﬁgures are stable over time. Detailed results
lable upon request.
32 J. Du, T. Mickiewicz / Journal of Business Venturing 31 (2016) 22–38This is our benchmark speciﬁcation. To test our H2–H4we next augment this model with interaction terms between the coverage
and age size and ownership variables. This produces Models (3)–(5):5 It is
ministra
before b
regionaπ
it
¼ α þ β0Covit þ γ0Cov2 it þ φ0Cov  Ageit þ κ 0Cov2  Ageit þ χ0Xit þ νt þ νi þ εit ð3Þπ
it
¼ α þ β0Covit þ γ0Cov2 it þ φ0Cov  Sizeit þ κ0Cov2  Sizeit þ χ0Xit þ νt þ νi þ εit ð4Þ
π
it
¼ α þ β0Covit þ γ0Cov2 it þ ϕ0Cov  Collit þ κ 0Cov2  Collit þ τ0Cov  Sharit þ ϑ0Cov2  Sharitþ
φ0Cov  Priit þ λ0Cov2  Priit þ ρ0Cov  Forit þ θ0Cov2  Forit þ χ0Xit þ νt þ νi þ εit
φ0Cov  Priit þ λ0Cov2  Priit þ ρ0Cov  Forit þ θ0Cov2  Forit þ χ0Xit þ νt þ νi þ εit:
ð5ÞSize and age as well as ownership variables are also included in vector X of control variables; this is not spelled out above for the
sake of brevity. Ownership features in the interaction terms, and State Sector is the omitted benchmark variable, Coll relates to
collective enterprises, Shar denotes shareholding companies, Priv relates to private ﬁrms (our key category of interest) and For to
foreign ﬁrms.
In addition, we test all these models utilising an alternative form of the variable representing subsidy distribution, namely the
second measure described above: mdev. This corresponds to Models (6)–(10) as presented below in the Results section. For each
model speciﬁcation, a joint signiﬁcance test is conducted to inform its appropriateness.
All equations are estimated using a ﬁxed effects panel estimator, corrected by applying robust standard errors clustered on
regional-city per year.5 The ﬁxed effect estimator deals, to some extent, with unobserved heterogeneity and potential endogeneity
in the model. Hausman tests were conducted both to test the endogeneity of ﬁxed effects, and to verify the adoption of panel ﬁxed
effects estimator over random effects estimator (Wooldrige, 2002).
6. Results
All the estimation results are reported in Tables 3 and 4 below, where Table 3 relates to Models (1)–(5), and Table 4 to Models
(6)–(10).
As discussed above, when we apply only the linear term of coverage ratio of subsidies (Coverage), we may face a model
misspeciﬁcation bias (Model (1)). Nevertheless, this is a useful test of an effective intervention model as depicted on Fig. 1 above
(Cases A). In this speciﬁcation Coverage is highly insigniﬁcantwith a coefﬁcient effectively estimated as zero, which implies no support
for the Pigouvian scenario. However, as soon as we add the quadratic terms (Model (2)), consistent with Case C of the impact of non-
transparent government, both coefﬁcients of Coverage become signiﬁcant, supporting H1. As we expected, there is a U-shaped
relationship between subsidy coverage ratio and average ﬁrm proﬁtability. When the coverage is very small the average proﬁtability
is high, and the level of proﬁtability drops as the coverage ratio increases, up to a certain point. After the turning point, the average
ﬁrm proﬁtability increases with further increase of subsidy coverage. Moreover, according to Model (2), the turning point is near
the middle of the distribution, as we expected.
The pattern of the effect of subsidies' coverage on proﬁtability varies clearly with ownership. From the coefﬁcients presented in
Model (3) we can see that the expected nonlinear effect of subsidies' coverage is highly ampliﬁed for private ﬁrms, as expected;
supporting H4. This is also easy to see from Fig. 2 below. The shape of the effect clearly changes with ownership, and the difference
between the private domestic companies and all others is striking.
In Model (4) we add the interaction effect between the size of ﬁrm and the subsidies' coverage to test H2. Again, the size absorbs
signiﬁcance and ampliﬁes the expected nonlinear effect of subsidies' coverage. While the second (quadratic) term is insigniﬁcant,
both terms remain jointly signiﬁcant based on t-test. Moreover, both linear and quadratic term in interactionwith size are highly sig-
niﬁcantwhenwe use our alternativemeasure of coverage (mdev; in Table 4). To see themagnitude of effectsmore clearly, we present
them in Fig. 3. The three alternative levels of employment chosen to illustrate the effects are one standard deviation below the mean
(30 employees), near themean (100 employees) and one standard deviation above themean (300 employees). Note that for the sake
of Fig. 3, we exponentiate back the logarithmof employment (a formused in estimations) to facilitate interpretation. For companies at
mean sample size and larger, the effect of subsidies' coverage is U-shaped. However for small companies it is more like reversed L-
shaped: they are not much affected until the coverage increases above 50%, when they start to beneﬁt. This suggests that there
may be a ‘pecking order’ of subsidies' distribution, where large companies receive support ﬁrst. Only when a large number of compa-
nies have been included in subsidies distribution, do the small companies take advantage.
InModel (5)we add the interaction term of Coverage and Age to test theH3.What happens is that the interactionwith age absorbs
most of the explanatory power, as easily seen from the corresponding signiﬁcance levels. Age clearly ampliﬁes the nonlinear effect of
subsidies' coverage on proﬁtability. To understand the way the interaction works we plot the marginal effects of the subsidies'useful to explain that in this paper “county” means county and county-city. County-city differs from regional-city in its administrative level. In China, the ad-
tive level immediately below a province is “regional city”. “County city” refers to cities that are at the same levels of counties, andmany of themwere counties
ecoming cities. They are practically administrated by regional cities. Our subsidy coverage variables are generated at county/county-city level to capture the
l heterogeneity, and clustered standard errors at regional-city per year level allow correlation of residuals of countries located in the same regional-city.
Table 3
Determinants of ﬁrm's proﬁtability.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Collective ﬁrms 0.005** (0.002) 0.005** (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.005** (0.002) 0.005** (0.002)
Shareholding ﬁrms 0.010*** (0.001) 0.010*** (0.001) 0.011*** (0.001) 0.010*** (0.001) 0.010*** (0.001)
Private ﬁrms 0.018*** (0.002) 0.018*** (0.002) 0.020*** (0.002) 0.018*** (0.002) 0.018*** (0.002)
Foreign ﬁrms 0.005** (0.002) 0.005** (0.002) 0.005* (0.002) 0.005** (0.002) 0.005** (0.002)
Subsidies coverage 0.0002 (0.005) −0.026* (0.011) −0.009* (0.004) 0.011 (0.020) 0.005 (0.012)
Collective × coverage 0.026** (0.010)
Shareholding × coverage −0.007 (0.011)
Private × coverage −0.053*** (0.015)
Foreign coverage 0.010 (0.013)
Coverage × coverage 0.030+ (0.017) 0.004 (0.004) 0.015 (0.029) 0.006 (0.019)
Collective × coverage × coverage −0.019 (0.012)
Shareholding × coverage × coverage 0.009 (0.015)
Private × coverage × coverage 0.072** (0.023)
Foreign × coverage × coverage −0.016 (0.022)
Age of ﬁrm −0.008*** (0.001) −0.008*** (0.001) −0.007*** (0.001) −0.007*** (0.001) −0.007*** (0.001)
Log of employment 0.020*** (0.001) 0.020*** (0.001) 0.020*** (0.001) 0.021*** (0.001) 0.020*** (0.001)
Market concentration −0.019*** (0.004) −0.021*** (0.004) −0.020*** (0.004) −0.021*** (0.004) −0.020*** (0.004)
Log of employment × coverage −0.008* (0.003)
Log of employment × coverage × coverage 0.003 (0.004)
Age × coverage −0.003*** (0.000)
Age × coverage × coverage 0.002*** (0.000)
Year 1999 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006**
Year 2000 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.015***
Year 2001 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
0.020*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019***
Year 2002 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
0.028*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.026***
Year 2003 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
0.035*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.033***
Year 2004 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.038***
Year 2005 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
0.065*** 0.066*** 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.063***
Year 2006 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
0.080*** 0.080*** 0.079*** 0.080*** 0.078***
Year 2007 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
0.111*** 0.111*** 0.110*** 0.111*** 0.108***
Year 2008 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
0.139*** 0.138*** 0.137*** 0.138*** 0.135***
R-squared 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637
Observations 2,205,070 2,205,070 2,205,070 2,205,070 2,205,070
Hausman test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of id 473,985 473,985 473,985 473,985 473,985
Notes: The results reported in this tablewere estimated using ﬁxed effects panel estimator, using reghdfe routine for Stata; see Correia (2014). The ownership dummies
interacted with the coverage of subsidy measure are: Collectively owned ﬁrms (COEs), Share-holding ﬁrms (SHR), pure private ﬁrms (private), and foreign invested
ﬁrms (FOR), the reference group is State-owned ﬁrms (SOEs). The ﬁgures reported in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by regional-city per year. The
joint signiﬁcance tests (F-tests) conducted to test if the coefﬁcients associated with the independent variables are jointly statistically signiﬁcant in the regression
model. Hausman test statistics are reported for the endogeneity of ﬁxed effects. Panel ﬁxed effects estimator is preferred over random effects estimator. The
observations that contained values of the ﬁxed effects repeated only once were dropped. See Table 1 for deﬁnitions of all variables. * indicates signiﬁcance at the
10% level. ** indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level. *** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level. We are indebted to the anonymous referee for helpful suggestions on
estimation technique.
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deviation below the mean (1 year old companies), at the mean (10 years old) and one standard deviation above the mean (20 years
old). The pattern that emerges is the following: proﬁtability of companies that have just started (when age equals 1) is simply not af-
fected by the distribution of subsidies. If anything, there is a slight upward linear trend, parallel to what we observed for companies of
small size, above. This may indicate again a ‘pecking order’ in subsidies, where the youngest companies beneﬁt only after the older
ones are covered already. However, the effect of Coverage becomes mildly nonlinear and U-shaped for ﬁrms at the mean age of 10,
and more clearly U-shaped for companies 20-years old. This is consistent with our H4. Interestingly, new companies seem to be
more proﬁtable than old, as can be easily assessed by the position of the corresponding curves on the graph: a simple correlation be-
tween age and proﬁtability is−13% and it does not disappear in the regression model, even if we control for ownership differences.
Table 4 replicates models of Table 3, but this time we usemdev as our measure of subsidies' distribution. The results seem quali-
tatively the same as in Table 3. The benchmarkmodel (6, similar to 2) for overall ﬁrms yields the same nonlinear pattern, however the
quadratic term is now insigniﬁcant. Interactionswith both age and size are again highly signiﬁcant and the effects work the sameway
as before. Likewise, the results for interaction with private ownership support H4.
Table 4
Determinants of ﬁrm's proﬁtability; Subsidies dispersion measured bymdev.
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Collective ﬁrms 0.005**
(0.002)
0.005**
(0.002)
0.003
(0.002)
0.005**
(0.002)
0.005**
(0.002)
Shareholding ﬁrms 0.010***
(0.001)
0.010***
(0.001)
0.011***
(0.001)
0.011***
(0.001)
0.011***
(0.001)
Private ﬁrms 0.018***
(0.002)
0.018***
(0.002)
0.019***
(0.002)
0.018***
(0.002)
0.018***
(0.002)
Foreign ﬁrms 0.005**
(0.002)
0.005**
(0.002)
0.006**
(0.002)
0.006**
(0.002)
0.006**
(0.002)
Subsidies: med abs dev −0.001**
(0.000)
−0.001+
(0.001)
−0.001***
(0.000)
0.005**
(0.002)
0.001
(0.001)
Collective × mdev 0.003***
(0.001)
Shareholding × mdev −0.001
(0.001)
Private × mdev −0.002+
(0.001)
Foreign × mdev 0.0003
(0.001)
mdev × mdev 0.000
(0.000)
−0.0002***
(0.000)
−0.0004**
(0.000)
−0.0001*
(0.000)
Collective × mdev × mdev 0.000
(0.000)
Shareholding × mdev × mdev 0.000***
(0.000)
Private × mdev × mdev 0.000***
(0.000)
Foreign × mdev × mdev 0.000***
(0.000)
Log of employment × mdev −0.001***
(0.0002)
Log of employment × mdev × mdev 0.0001***
(0.0000)
Age × mdev −0.0002***
(0.0000)
Age × mdev × mdev 0.0000***
(0.0000)
Age of ﬁrm −0.008***
(0.001)
−0.008***
(0.001)
−0.007***
(0.001)
−0.007***
(0.001)
−0.007***
(0.001)
Log of employment 0.020***
(0.001)
0.020***
(0.001)
0.020***
(0.001)
0.020***
(0.001)
0.019***
(0.001)
Market concentration −0.020***
(0.004)
−0.020***
(0.004)
−0.020***
(0.004)
−0.020***
(0.004)
−0.020***
(0.004)
Year 1999 0.006**
(0.002)
0.006**
(0.002)
0.006**
(0.002)
0.006**
(0.002)
0.006**
(0.002)
Year 2000 0.016***
(0.003)
0.016***
(0.003)
0.015***
(0.003)
0.016***
(0.003)
0.015***
(0.003)
Year 2001 0.020***
(0.004)
0.020***
(0.004)
0.019***
(0.004)
0.020***
(0.004)
0.019***
(0.004)
Year 2002 0.028***
(0.005)
0.028***
(0.005)
0.027***
(0.005)
0.028***
(0.005)
0.027***
(0.005)
Year 2003 0.035***
(0.006)
0.035***
(0.006)
0.034***
(0.005)
0.035***
(0.006)
0.034***
(0.005)
Year 2004 0.040***
(0.006)
0.040***
(0.006)
0.039***
(0.006)
0.040***
(0.006)
0.039***
(0.006)
Year 2005 0.065***
(0.007)
0.065***
(0.007)
0.065***
(0.007)
0.065***
(0.007)
0.064***
(0.007)
Year 2006 0.080***
(0.008)
0.080***
(0.008)
0.079***
(0.008)
0.080***
(0.008)
0.078***
(0.008)
Year 2007 0.111***
(0.009)
0.111***
(0.009)
0.110***
(0.009)
0.111***
(0.009)
0.109***
(0.009)
Year 2008 0.138***
(0.011)
0.138***
(0.011)
0.137***
(0.011)
0.138***
(0.011)
0.136***
(0.011)
Observations 2,197,458 2,197,458 2,197,458 2,197,458 2,197,458
R-squared 0.638 0.638 0.638 0.638 0.638
Hausman test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of id 472,696 472,696 472,696 472,696 472,696
Notes: Please see Table 3 above.
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Fig. 2.Weak institutions, ownership and proﬁtability of Chinese ﬁrms.
35J. Du, T. Mickiewicz / Journal of Business Venturing 31 (2016) 22–386.1. Robustness checks
The ﬁxed effects (FE) estimatorwe apply to our speciﬁcations is consistent butmay not be efﬁcient.We also run the randomeffects
(RE) version of our models; nevertheless we found, using the Hausman test, that the FE models should be relied upon. In addition,
while the RE model can be seen as the simplest form of multilevel modelling, we also apply a more complex multilevel model,
which contains three levels: individual observation in a given year; ﬁrm level random effect; and sector-region random effect. Fur-
thermore, we experimented on controlling for different levels of clustering the standard errors. Besides the results reported in our
baseline model where we cluster the standard errors by region-city per year, we also tried clustering the standard errors by province
per year, regional-city per year per sector. The results were again not affected.
Themain objection that can be raised against ourmodelling is thatwe donot include any direct rent seekingmeasures, yet assume
rent-seeking in between uneven distribution of subsidies and performance outcomes. The reasonwe followed that strategy is not be-
cause such measures are not available. In fact, in the Chinese context, entertainment and gift giving expenditure have been used as a
measure of rent seeking (e.g., Cai et al., 2011; Du et al., 2013), and we have this variable in our dataset. However, the difﬁculty in
modelling lies in the fact that performance is affected both directly by the quality of the institutional/policy context and indirectly
by rent seeking, which in turn is endogenous vis-à-vis the institutional/policy environment. Thus the equations we report can be
seen as reduced form speciﬁcations, wherebywe regress performance on our proposedmeasures of the quality of institutional/policy
context, which we take as exogenous with respect to individual proﬁtability. However, as a robustness check, we also run speciﬁca-
tions where we add rent seeking expenditure and its squared term. As expected, we ﬁnd highly signiﬁcant and positive effects of
rent seeking on proﬁtability (in both linear and square terms), indicating some basic rationality in the way the entrepreneurs and
managers behave. Importantly, our results for subsidies' coverage are not affected.
In addition, we also estimated the likelihood of receiving subsidies as a function of rent seeking, with the same set of variables we
use in our core models of proﬁtability plus coverage of subsidies, applying both a ﬁxed effects (FE) and a random effects (RE) logit.
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36 J. Du, T. Mickiewicz / Journal of Business Venturing 31 (2016) 22–38model. For rent seeking taken in logarithmic form, which corresponds to the functional form we used in our formal model, the coef-
ﬁcient is signiﬁcant at 0.001 and positive for both models, suggesting diminishing returns to rent seeking. Likewise, a speciﬁcation
with rent seeking in linear and quadratic term results in positive linear and negative quadratic terms, both signiﬁcant at 0.001, for
FE and RE speciﬁcations. The Hausman test again points to FE model in both cases. These supplementary results are important;
both because they support the functional form of rent seeking we adopted in our model above, and because they are consistent
with the approach taken by most of the existing literature on rent seeking, which assumes diminishing returns (see: Mueller, 2003).
Finally,we explore the sensitivity of our results to the deﬁnition ofﬁrmperformance. Comparable to the set ofmodels presented in
Table 3, we experimentwithmeasuringﬁrm business performance by return on sales (deﬁned by operating proﬁt over sales), growth
in proﬁtability (deﬁned by the growth rate of the operating proﬁt) and growth in sales revenue. Our main results are insensitive to
these alterations. All these additional results are available on request.
7. Discussion
Wemodel the impact of uneven, non-transparent distribution of government controlled resources in China, and contrast entrepre-
neurswithmanagers of large, old, and state ﬁrms. By extending Puffer et al. (2010), we distinguish intrusive, non-transparent govern-
ment from predatory government, and draw wider implications on the effects of institutional weaknesses in emerging markets. The
existingmodelling in the context of emerging economies focusesmore on the predatory government such as that of Russia (e.g., Aidis
et al., 2008). Our studyﬁlls the gap in the literature by concentrating on the intrusive non-transparent yet non-predatory government
in China.
We consider the lack of consistency in subsidies' distribution as an indicator of weak institutions, and demonstrate that the effects
on young and small companies in comparisonwithmoremature ones differ.We ﬁnd that this type ofweak institution leaves space for
entrepreneurship, yet increases its cost by divertingmanagerial resources from productive engagements to rent-seeking activities. At
the same time, our evidence suggests that young and small companies are much less affected compared to their larger and private
counterparts, presumably because the ﬁxed costs of building government connections and lobbying for government supports are rel-
atively high, and theymay initiallymainly rely on private networks and a private set of resources. It follows, that for somenew emerg-
ing companies, staying small may be a safe strategy, yet this is not a beneﬁcial outcome from the wider economic point of view.
We believe that our ﬁndingsmake a particular contribution to the economics of entrepreneurship research. Our arguments, simple
formalisation, and empirical results, all suggest that new companies are less affected by lower institutional quality. This aspect of
Chinese environment is consistent with what we observe around the world, for example in many Latin American countries as also
noticed by Huang (2008). Weak institutions do not necessary result in low rates of entry. However, an important question that
goes beyond entry is that of the subsequent dynamism, growth and innovation of young ﬁrms. Our ﬁndings do not shed direct
light on that. But given that larger, private companies seem to be more affected by dysfunctional formal environments, weak institu-
tional quality may either slow down business dynamism or, although dynamism perseveres, it comes at a higher cost.
At the same time, a non-transparent government is not the same as the big governmentwe observe in developed countries.While
these two aspects of government may be correlated as argued by Hayek (1960), they remain different (Aidis et al., 2012). Extensive
government intervention that is not arbitrary may come with welfare cost via taxation and diversion of resources, but there is less
social waste related to rent seeking. In particular, where all similar ﬁrms receive the same amount of subsidies, their performance
is not affected negatively.
China, with its institutional and policy heterogeneity across space and across industrial sectors offers a very good empirical coun-
terpart to test the simple model we developed. This institutional heterogeneity played an important part in China's reforms and eco-
nomic success over the last decades, as it allowed experimentation and gradual institutional change without challenging the position
37J. Du, T. Mickiewicz / Journal of Business Venturing 31 (2016) 22–38of the political elites at the national level (Coase andWang, 2012; Xu, 2011; Zhang, 2015). It is unique in that the emerging entrepre-
neurial sector hasmade signiﬁcant institutional innovations based on norms andnetworks (Nee andOpper, 2012), and contributed to
the fast pace of economic growth in the last three decades (Huang, 2008). However, as economists have come to agree, both the rate of
growth and the pattern of growthmatter. Creating inclusive formal institutions to support emergent private organisations is the key to
sustaining economic development or to decreasing the cost of it in forgone consumption. Our ﬁndings in this paper demonstrate some
areas of China's institutionalweaknesses that generate anunlevelled playing ground for ﬁrms. Clearly, it is to the beneﬁt of state sector
ﬁrms and at the overall expense of ﬁrms' proﬁtability, private ﬁrms in particular. This indicates the scope for further reforms. The in-
stitutional evolution in China, even if it does not follow a linear pattern (Huang, 2008; Zhang, 2015), offers hope that these reforms
will come. While it is probably less likely that China will develop into a predatory state (or “oligarchic capitalism”, to use Baumol
et al. (2007) terminology), it remains to be seen if its development path will lead towards a form of “entrepreneurial capitalism” or
towards the “state-led capitalism” model (ibid., p. 60).
Last but not least, we need to stress an important limitation to our study.While we focus on entrepreneurs andmanagers, another
ﬁeld of research would be to understand both the broader question of motivation and the narrower question of rent-seeking behav-
iour within the Chinese state administration. While some researchers have already moved in that direction (e.g., Pei, 2006), more
needs to be done. Entrepreneurship theory may contribute to our understanding of that ﬁeld also, since Baumol's (1996) concept
of ‘unproductive entrepreneurship’ can be applied to some forms of behaviour of government ofﬁcials.
8. Conclusion
Baumol (1996) emphasises the impact of the ‘rules of the game’ on entrepreneurship, and de-emphasises long-term cultural fac-
tors: it is an optimistic perspective, as it suggests scope for reform.We take the lack of transparency in subsidies' distribution as a con-
venient indicator of a wider range of deﬁciencies in the institutional framework, not as the single most important institutional issue.
However, we hope that our results identify subsidisation policies as needing reform. This is important for enhancing the institutional
quality of China, so that the trajectory of growth may continue to transform China into an “entrepreneurial economy” (Baumol et al.,
2007).
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